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Prof. Dr. Robert Feicht, Dipl.-Math. Dipl.-Kfm.

  • Quantitative methods in business and economic sciences
  • Stochastic processes
  • Big data analytics
  • Energy and resources
  • Education for sustainable development

Faculty of European Campus Rottal-Inn

Professors

Professor

QM Representative

AA 222

0991/3615-8864

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Appointments can be made via email.

Sortierung:
Book
  • Robert Feicht
  • W. Stummer

Complete closed-form solution to a stochastic growth model and corresponding speed of economic recovery. IWQW Discussion Paper Nr. 5.

In: FAU Discussion Papers in Economics

Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg

  • (2010)

show abstract

We consider a continuous-time neoclassical one-sector stochastic growth model of Ramsey-type with CRRA utility and Cobb-Douglas technology, where each of the following components are exposed to exogeneous uncertainties (shocks): capital stock K, effectiveness of labor A, and labor force L; the corresponding dynamics is modelled by a system of three interrelated stochastic differential equations. For this framework, we solve completely explicitly the problem of a social planner who seeks to maximize expected lifetime utility of consumption. In particular, for any (e.g. short-term) time-horizon t > 0 we obtain in closed form the sample paths of the economy values Kt,At, Lt and the optimal consumption copt(Kt,At, Lt) as well as the non-equilibrium sample paths of the per capita effective capital stock kt = Kt / At Lt . Moreover, we also deduce explicitly the limiting long-term behaviour of kt expressed by the corresponding steady-state equilibrium distribution. As illustration, we present some Monte Carlo simulations where the abovementioned economy is considerably disturbed (out of equilibrium) by a sudden crash but recovers well within a realistic-size time-period.
Contribution
  • Robert Feicht
  • W. Stummer

An explicit non-stationary stochastic growth model. Chapter 7 of the book: O. de la Grandville (ed.), Economic Growth and Development, Frontiers of Economics and Globalization.

In: Economic growth and development. (Frontiers of economics and globalization) vol. 11 pg. 141-202

  • Eds.:
  • La Grandville, Olivier de

Emerald Group Pub Ltd Bingley, UK

  • (2011)
Journal article
  • Robert Feicht
  • V. Grimm
  • M. Seebauer

An experimental study of corporate social responsibility through charitable giving in Bertrand markets.

In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization vol. 124 pg. 88-101

  • (2016)

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2015.11.005

show abstract

We experimentally investigate a Bertrand market with homogenous goods in which sellers can announce the donation of a share of their profits to an existing non-profit organization. In a 2 × 2 design, we vary the credibility of announcements and the efficiency of the contributions to the public fund. We find that sellers’ donations are strictly positive independently of the credibility of the announcements, and their donations are higher if announcements are credible and efficiency is high. However, market outcomes in terms of prices and profits do not differ significantly in any treatment that allows for contributions to a public fund. Analysis of buyer decisions reveals that prices are the main driver of purchase decisions while higher donations only affect purchase decisions when they are credible and price differences are negligible. Our results indicate that under intense competition the possibility of attracting customers through corporate social responsibility activities is limited, although the constant positive level of contributions suggests that norms lead to a certain minimum level of corporate social responsibility.
Journal article
  • Robert Feicht
  • V. Grimm
  • H. Rau
  • G. Stephan

On the impact of quotas and decision rules in collective bargaining..

In: European Economic Review vol. 100 pg. 175-192

  • (2017)

DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.08.004

show abstract

We conduct a novel type of multi-person one-shot game that reflects important aspects of collective bargaining. In all treatments a proposer has to divide a pie among herself and two groups of three recipients each. She cannot discriminate within, but across groups. A committee with representatives from one or both groups takes acceptance decisions. In a 2 × 2 design we vary (i) representation in the decision committee (one vs. both groups) and (ii) the decision rule (unanimity vs. majority voting). We find that (i) representation of a group in the committee is crucial for receiving a significant share, (ii) proposals are balanced only if both groups have veto power, (iii) negotiations often fail if the decision environment gives insufficient guidance on what an appropriate proposal is, and (iv) non-binding communication substantially reduces rejection rates and proposer shares.
Journal article
  • Robert Feicht
  • Jennifer Huber
  • Anna Marquardt

Education for Sustainable Development – approaches by the InnoLab for Sustainability at the European Campus Rottal-Inn.

In: Bavarian Journal of Applied Sciences (Spotlights section) vol. 5 pg. 486-493

  • (2019)

DOI: 10.25929/bjas.v5i1.69